Holger Andreas

Associate Professor

Global Studies, Philosophy, Power, Conflict and Ideas
Office: SCI 211
Phone: 250.807.8130
Email: holger.andreas@ubc.ca


Research Summary

Philosophy of science, formal epistemology, logic.

Courses & Teaching

Philosophy of science, logic, metaphysics, and epistemology.

Biography

Video Intro

Websites

Holger Andreas’ Research Website

Degrees

PhD, University of Leipzig

Research Interests & Projects

My research interrelates philosophical logic with epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of science; novel results in philosophy of mind and cogntive science have emerged from it as well.

Philosophy of Science:
Theoretical concepts, causation, and explanation.

Philosophical Logic:
Conditionals, nonmonotonic and paraconsistent reasoning, tractability.

Epistemology:
AGM-style belief revision theory, model-theoretic argument.

Cognitive and Computer Science:
Tractability and modularity of human cognition, truth maintenance.

History of Philosophy:
Identity philosophy in Leibniz, Schelling, and Hegel.

Selected Publications & Presentations

Books

  1. (Forthcoming): From Reasons to Causes: A Theory of Causation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, accepted and forthcoming (with Mario Günther).
  2. (2020): Dynamic Tractable Reasoning: A Modular Approach to Belief Revision, Synthese Library, Cham: Springer.
  3. (2007): Carnaps Wissenschaftslogik. Eine Untersuchung zur Zweistufenkonzeption, Paderborn: mentis.

Editions 

  1. (2016): Logical Studies of Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics, Trends in Logic 45, Cham: Springer, co-edited with Peter Verdeé.
  2. (2014): Perspectives on Structuralism, Special Issue for Erkenntnis, Vol. 79, coedited with Frank Zenker.

Journal Papers

  1. (Forthcoming): Factual Difference-Making, Australasian Philosophical Review, forthcoming (with Mario Günther).
  2. (2024): A Lewisian Regularity Theory, Philosophical Studies 181: 2145–2176 (with Mario Günther).
  3. (2024): A Regularity Theory of Causation, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105: 2–32 (with Mario Günther).
  4. (2023): Counterfactuals for Causal Responsibility in Legal Contexts, Artificial Intelligence and Law 31: 115–132 (with Matthias Armgardt und Mario Günther).
  5. (2023): Modal Structuralism with Theoretical Terms, Erkenntnis 88: 721–745 (with Georg Schiemer).
  6. (2022): Actual Causation, Dialectica 76(1): 1–44 (with Mario Günther).
  7. (2022): A Simple and Non-Trivial Ramsey Test. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 31: 309–325.
  8. (2021): Difference-Making Causation, Journal of Philosophy 118: 680–701 (with Mario Günther).
  9. (2021): An Analysis of Disposition Concepts by the Ramsey Test, Synthese 198: 11379–11397.
  10. (2021): A Ramsey Test Analysis of Causation for Causal Models, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72: 587–615 (with Mario Günther).
  11. (2020): Causation in Terms of Production, Philosophical Studies 177(6): 1565–1591 (with Mario Günther).
  12. (2019): Explanatory Conditionals, Philosophy of Science 86(5): 993–1004.
  13. (2019): On the Ramsey Test Analysis of ‘Because’, Erkenntnis 84: 1229–1262 (with Mario Günther).
  14. (2019): Hypothetical Interventions and Belief Changes, Foundations of Science 24: 681–704 (with Lorenzo Casini).
  15. (2018): Modular Semantics of Theories: An Approach to Paraconsistent Reasoning, Journal of Philosophical Logic 47: 877–912.
  16. (2016): A Choice-Semantical Approach to Theoretical Truth, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 58: 1–8 (with Georg Schiemer).
  17. (2015): A Finite Memory Argument for an Axiomatic Conception of Scientific Theories, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29: 113–128.
  18. (2014): Carnapian Structuralism, Erkenntnis 79: 1373–1391.
  19. (2013): Deductive Reasoning in the Structuralist Approach, Studia Logica 101: 1093–1113.
  20. (2011): A Structuralist Theory of Belief Revision, Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20: 205–232.
  21. (2011): Semantic Challenges to Scientific Realism, Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42: 17–31.
  22. (2010): A Modal View of the Semantics of Theoretical Sentences, Synthese 174: 367–383.
  23. (2010): New Account of Empirical Claims in Structuralism, Synthese 176: 311–332.
  24. (2010): Semantic Holism in Scientific Language, Philosophy of Science 77: 524–543.
  25. (2008): Ontological Aspects of Measurement, Axiomathes 18: 379–394.
  26. (2008): Another Solution to the Problem of Theoretical Terms, Erkenntnis 69: 315–333.

Encyclopedia Entries 

  1. (2013): Theoretical Terms in Science, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
  2. (2021): Regularity and Inferential Theories of Causation, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (with Mario Günther).

 

Apologies, but no results were found.